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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
APPLicATION OF TH-E EXCLUSioNARY RULE TO NEW YORK TnSis

BEFORE

MAPP V. OHIO

During the 1961 Court of Appeals term several decisions were handed down
relating to the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in state criminal prosecutions. These decisions were prompted by Mapp v. Ohio,' in which the
Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure was
inadmissible in state courts as well as federal. The Court of Appeals has been
presented with the question of whether Mapp will be applied to pre-Mapp trials,
and if so, to which ones. The approach of the Court has been to give a
restrictive effect to Mapp. Although the problem of retroactivity is an unsettled
one, it is the contention of this writer that the narrow lines drawn as to when
Mapp will apply are both unjust and illogical.
The United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 2 ruled that
evidence illegally obtained by a Federal Marshal was inadmissible in a federal
court. It was held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited illegal searches and
seizures, and federal courts are required not to lend support to such action
by admitting evidence so found. Then, in 1949, the Supreme Court in Wolf v.
Colorado3 held that evidence illegally obtained was not inadmissible in state
courts. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as applicable to the states
by the "due process clause" do not dictate exclusion; it is for the states to
decide how they will enforce the right to privacy. The Supreme Court has
chosen exclusion in federal courts to deter federal violation, but the states may
choose their own methods. But, on June 19, 1961, the Court overruled Wolf v.
Colorado, holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and must apply to state courts. 4 Unfortunately, yet perhaps expectedly, the Court made no definitive statement as
to the retrospective or prospective effect to be given the decision. However, in
a footnote it implied that the effect may be retrospective. 5
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2.
3.

232 U.S. 383 (1914).
338 U.S. 25.

4. Mapp, supra note 1.
5. The Court in Mapp, supra note 1, at 659, said:
There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, that under our
constitutional exclusionary doctrine '(t)he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.' People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587. In some
cases this will undoubtedly be the result.
Then in footnote 9, supra note 1, at 659, the Court continued:
As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements governing assertion
and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected. We note, moreover, that the class of state convictions
possibly affected by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when compared
with Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, and Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U.S. 116. In those cases the same contention was urged and later
proved unfounded. In any case, further delay in reaching the present result could
have no effect other than to compound the difficulties.
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The first Mapp case to reach the Court of Appeals was People v. Loria,
10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Nov. 30 1961). Defendant
was convicted of narcotics violations by illegally seized evidence in January,
1961. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division on June 13, 1961,
six days before Mapp. The Court of Appeals held "that the Mapp rule is to be
applied in our review of pending appeals from pre-Mapp convictions." Effect
was given to the "general rule" that the Court apply the law as it exists at the
time of its decision. The Court reversed the conviction upon the condition that
the State be allowed an opportunity to prove the legality of the search.
On April 5, 1962, four Mapp-related cases were decided which, taken
together, may bewilder both laymen and practitioners. In People v. Coffey,
11 N.Y.2d 142, 182 N.E.2d 92, 227 N.Y.S.2d 412, an Appellate Division
affirmance of conviction on questionable evidence had been rendered. The
argument occurred before June 19, but the affirmance was given after Mapp.
The Court of Appeals withheld determination but ordered the Court of Special
Sessions to determine specially the legality of the search and seizure involved.
The Court of Appeals made two major points. First, on the basis of Loria,
the Court would apply Mapp to appeals reaching it in ordinary course even
though the trial occurred before June 19th. Second, it found that defendant
had sufficiently protested the use of the questionable evidence to the trial court
so as to preserve the issue for review.
The District Attorney conceded in People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148, 182
N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962), that the search and seizure of evidence
on which defendant was convicted was unlawful, but contended that the
Court could not review the question since no objection was made at the preMapp trial. In reversing the conviction and dismissing the information, the
Court of Appeals found that defendant's counsel had made general objections
and had asked the police officer "under what law" did he enter the house
without "making an arrest and without a warrant." These objections were
sufficient although no specific constitutional grounds were stated.
Defendant in People v. Muller, 11 N.Y.2d 154, 182 N.E.2d 99, 227
N.Y.S.2d 421 (1962), was convicted of narcotics possession in 1953 on evidence
now questionable. The Appellate Division affirmed in October 1954. Leave to
appeal was denied on November 8, 1954; reargument of the motion for leave
was denied in December 1955, January 1956, and November 1961. Leave was
finally granted to consider the applicability of Mapp v. Ohio. Affirming the
judgment, the Court distinguished Loria,supra, which arose in the normal course
of appeal. Here, the appellate process was completed on November 8, 1954.
Since no appeal could be said to be pending on June 19, 1961, Mapp would
not apply.
The fourth of these cases decided on April 5, 1962, was People v. Friola,
11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423. No objection was made
to the evidence presented at the pre-June 19 trial. The Court held that "no
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6
question of law has been preserved for our review." There was no inquiry
7
or protest which met the statutory standard for saving issues for review.
The final Mapp case of the term, People v. Yarmosh, 11 N.Y.2d 397,
184 N.E.2d 165, 230 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1962), reversed a conviction on the
strength of O'Neill, supra, and Friola, supra. Defense counsel established that
there was no search warrant, and questioned an officer regarding defendants'
constitutional rights.
It is interesting to note that the only dissent in all these cases was that
of Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Fuld in Friola. There the Chief Judge
carefully pointed out the weakness of requiring an objection at trial. At trials
before Mapp, there was no basis, either statutory or constitutional, for such
objection. Reasonably, defense counsel would hesitate to raise a then pointless
objection for fear of antagonizing judge and jury. Thus, the Court is now
rewarding defendants who had the good fortune to be represented by a lawyer
who was either careless or possessed of a crystal ball. At the same time, the
line drawn favoring a defendant having an appeal pending on June 19, 1961,
over one whose appeal was decided June 16 (June 19 being a Monday) is slim
indeed. The Court of Appeals has done its best to limit the applicability of
the Supreme Court ruling. But was this goal proper? Undoubtedly many
appeals from prisoners tried long ago would be presented if broader scope were
given the Mapp holding. Also, many may believe society should be protected
from these criminals convicted before Mapp. But where individual freedom
and the integrity of the system of law are at stake, administrative inconvenience should not be a bar. Then, too, maintenance of respect for constitutionally protected rights ought to be worth the price of freeing some convicts.
Although the Supreme Court itself has not yet decided Mapp retroactively, it
has shown little apprehension over the asserted fear of prison gates being
thrown open. In 1956 it held that a state must, under the Federal Constitution,
grant indigent prisoners adequate appellate review including free transcripts
to submit for review.8 Then, two years later, it reversed a state court denial of
9
habeas corpus to a prisoner convicted and denied a free transcript in 1935.
The task of the Court of Appeals, like that of all responsible bodies, is
10
often a thankless one. On such an unclear yet controversial problem, the Court
would be criticized whichever tack it took. But arguments of State reliance upon
Wolf v. Colorado, or of the need to protect society, lose their impact when
countered by considerations of judicial integrity, fairness, and a dislike for
arbitrariness and "luck" in the administration of justice.
R.V.B.

6. 11 N.Y.2d at 159, 182 N.E.2d at 101, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24.
7. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 420-a.
8. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12.
9. Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
10. Bender, Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision, 110 U. Pa
L. Rev. 650 (1962); Torda and King, Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional
Concepts, 66 Dick. L. Rev. 269 (1962).

